Deep disagreements, i.e., disagreements that involve either content so intertwined with our identity and/or that lack agreed upon methods of resolution thereby preventing their resolvability, have been gaining increased attention in recent argumentation and philosophical scholarship.
Paralleling this work, in this paper I introduce a discussion of the phenomenon of deep agreements, that is, agreements so deep that disagreement cannot overcome them. To do so, I discuss an example of a seemingly self-contradictory Trump MAGA supporter who maintains her agreement with the Trump MAGA ideology despite directly admitting to evidence that should change her mind.
The analysis reveals two types of deep agreement: 1) ‘merely’ deep agreement, which signals an agreement held with deep conviction in a single instance, and 2) ‘entrenched’ agreement, which signals several deep agreements on interrelated issues central to our identities.
After distinguishing deep agreements from the related concepts of beliefs, closed-mindedness, and indoctrination, I offer some of theoretical insights into the implications of deep agreements for both the social-political realm as well as within argumentation theory scholarship.Michael Baumtrog (2024). Deep Agreements. Episteme (accepted).