Season 2, Ep. 4: Brokering borders — EU bilateral agreements and the price of ‘return migration’

Below, you will find links to all of the research referenced by our guests, as well as other resources you may find useful.

Media

Sparks, R. (19 October 2023). Is the EU doubling down on a deadly, failed migration strategy (external link) ? The New Humanitarian.

Diallo, B. (28 August 2023). Competing Imperatives? Migration and the African Continental Free Trade Area (external link) . New Security Beat.

The gateway to the Sahara - The dangerous way from Africa to Europe. (external link)  DW Documentary.

Horncastle, J. (7 February 2023). The EU shows its weaknesses again amid another looming migration crisis (external link) . The Conversation.

Maasdorp, L. & Cain, J. (5 June 2022). The award-winning African documentary project that goes inside the lives of migrants. (external link)  The Conversation.

Research Projects & Policy

Arhin-Sam, K. (2019).  (PDF file) The political economy of migration governance in Nigeria (external link) . Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, Freiburg.

Castillejo, C. (2019). The influence of EU migration policy on regional free movement in the IGAD and ECOWAS regions (external link)  (No. 11/2019). Discussion paper.

(July 17, 2023). EU/Tunisia: Agreement on migration ‘makes EU complicit’ in abuses against asylum seekers, refugees and migrants (external link) . Amnesty International.

EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding (external link) . European Parliament.

Books

Anghel, R. G., Fauser, M., & Boccagni, P. (Eds.). (2019). Transnational return and social change: Hierarchies, identities and ideas (external link) . Anthem Press.

Bisong, A. (2022). Return, precarity and vulnerability in West Africa: Evidence from Nigeria. In, J. Teye (Ed.), Migration in West Africa: IMISCOE Regional Reader  (external link) (pp. 211-236). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Geddes, A. & Scholten, P. (2016). The politics of migration and immigration in Europe (external link) . Sage Publications.

Geddes, A. (2008). Immigration and European Integration: Beyond Fortress Europe? (external link)  Manchester University Press.

Hayden, S. (2023). My Fourth Time, We Drowned: Seeking Refuge on the World's Deadliest Migration Route (external link) . Melville House.

Academic Works

Adam, I., Trauner, F., Jegen, L., & Roos, C. (2020). West African interests in (EU) migration policy. Balancing domestic priorities with external incentives (external link) . Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 46(15), 3101-3118.

Adepoju, A., Van Noorloos, F., & Zoomers, A. (2010). Europe’s migration agreements with migrant‐sending countries in the global south: A critical review (external link) . International migration, 48(3), 42-75.

Bisong, A. (2022). Invented, invited and instrumentalised spaces: conceptualising non-state actor engagement in regional migration governance in West Africa (external link) . Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 48(12), 2945-2963.

Bisong, A. (2019). Trans-regional institutional cooperation as multilevel governance: ECOWAS migration policy and the EU (external link) . Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 45(8), 1294-1309.

Collyer, M. (2016). Geopolitics as a migration governance strategy: European Union bilateral relations with Southern Mediterranean countries (external link) . Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 42(4), 606-624.

Dako-Gyeke, M., & Kodom, R. B. (2017). Deportation and re-integration: Exploring challenges faced by deportee residents in the Nkoranza Municipality, Ghana (external link) . Journal of International Migration and Integration, 18, 1083-1103.

Geddes, A. (2005). Europe's border relationships and international migration relations (external link) . JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 43(4), 787-806.

Kandilige, L., & Adiku, G. (2020). The Quagmire of return and reintegration: Challenges to multi‐stakeholder co‐ordination of involuntary returns (external link) . International Migration, 58(4), 37-53.

Kandilige, L., & Adiku, G. A. (2019). Returns of failure: Involuntary return migration and social change in Ghana (external link) . Transnational Return and Social Change, 63.

Mensah, J., Teye, J. K., & Setrana, M. B. (2022). The Janus-face of contemporary migration: Perspectives on West African return migration and transnationalism with a focus on Ghana and Senegal (external link) . Migration in West Africa, 237.

Kleist, N. (2017). Disrupted migration projects: The moral economy of involuntary return to Ghana from Libya (external link) . Africa, 87(2), 322-342.

Kleist, N. (2017). Returning with Nothing but an Empty Bag (external link) . In, N. Kleist & D. Thorsen (Eds.), Hope and uncertainty in contemporary African migration (173-192). Routledge.

Kleist, N. (2020). Trajectories of involuntary return migration to Ghana: Forced relocation processes and post-return life (external link) . Geoforum, 116, 272-281.

Mensah, E. A. (2016). Involuntary return migration and reintegration. The case of Ghanaian migrant workers from Libya (external link) . Journal of International Migration and Integration, 17, 303-323.

Murray-Evans, P. (2015). Regionalism and African agency: negotiating an economic partnership agreement between the European Union and SADC-Minus (external link) . Third World Quarterly, 36(10), 1845-1865.

Oliveira Martins, B., & Strange, M. (2019). Rethinking EU external migration policy: contestation and critique (external link) . Global Affairs, 5(3), 195-202.

Reslow, N., & Vink, M. (2015). Three‐Level Games in EU External Migration Policy: Negotiating Mobility Partnerships in West Africa (external link) . JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(4), 857-874.

Trauner, F., & Deimel, S. (2013). The impact of EU migration policies on African countries: The case of Mali (external link) . International Migration, 51(4), 20-32.

Yeboah, T., Kandilige, L., Bisong, A., Garba, F., & Kofi Teye, J. (2021). The ECOWAS free movement protocol and diversity of experiences of different categories of migrants: A qualitative study (external link) . International Migration, 59(3), 228-244

Zanker, F. (2019). Managing or restricting movement? Diverging approaches of African and European migration governance (external link) . Comparative Migration Studies, 7(1), 1-18.

Maggie Perzyna: Welcome to Borders & Belonging, a podcast that explores regional migration issues in a global context. This series is produced by CERC Migration in collaboration with Lead Podcasting. I'm Maggie Perzyna, a researcher with the Canada Excellence Research Chair in Migration and Integration program at Toronto Metropolitan University.  In the pursuit of controlling its external borders, the European Union has forged numerous bilateral agreements with African countries. These agreements are not just pieces of paper, they're instruments that wield immense influence over the movement of people between Europe and Africa. Today, we're discussing how these agreements are designed to deter migration, enhance border controls, and address the root causes of people leaving their home countries. But it's not a one size fits all solution. We'll delve into the nuanced impact and migration patterns, as well as ethical concerns. We'll examine the multifaceted landscape of EU bilateral agreements, and how they're reshaping the migration dynamics on both continents. In a moment, I'll be joined by two esteemed researchers to learn more about EU bilateral agreements and the price of return migration. This can refer to repatriation, deportation, or someone voluntarily returning to their country of origin. But first, we'll hear from someone who has himself returned to Ghana, from the UK, and who knows many others who have also returned to their countries of origin.

Dr. Leander Kandilige: My name is Dr. Leander Kandilige. I'm a senior lecturer at the Center for Migration Studies. That's at the University of Ghana in West Africa. And I'm currently in Ghana, even though my family lives in the U.K. 

Maggie Perzyna: Dr. Kandilige's return home was voluntary, and the transition back to living in Ghana was relatively smooth. But over the years, he's met people who've been deported. Some have been so ashamed of their situation, that they've lied to immigration officers about which country they originally came from,

Dr. Leander Kandilige: They will rather be deported to the wrong country. And then they will find their way of getting to maybe even the origin country in a dignified manner. They don't want to be at the glare of the media being deported on a chartered flight. So, they will rather go to Ghana when they are from Nigeria or go to Nigeria when they are from Ghana, and so on and so forth. 

Maggie Perzyna: And even when they do eventually make it back home, the fear of facing up to their communities can be debilitating. 

Dr. Leander Kandilige: Now, the shame and stigma that is attached to being returned, being deported, is such that these individuals cannot go back to their families. So, some of them become stranded in the capital. If, for instance, they've sold family property to be able to migrate and they are deported. How or what they will tell the family is a problem. 

Maggie Perzyna: Dr.Kandilige knows these experiences to be true, not only because he is a researcher focused on migration, but also because of personal connections he's made over the course of his life in both the UK and Ghana.

Dr. Leander Kandilige: So, in my case, I went to Oxford University in 2001 to pursue my master's degree in forced migration. I was fortunate enough to win a full scholarship, which paid for my tuition fees and then also catered for a stipend. And under those conditions, my migration to the UK was very different from most of my peers, my friends and associates.

Maggie Perzyna: Dr. Kandilige eventually became a British citizen and lived in the UK until 2014. He has since returned to Ghana for professional reasons, but he visits Europe often. While he actively made a choice to move back to Ghana, many other migrants don't have an option for some, returning to their country of origin as a matter of life and death. 

Dr. Leander Kandilige: Based on individuals, I mean, just to anonymize a person's identity, I wouldn't mention them by name. By an individual who migrated to Libya and then try to cross over to Europe on three separate occasions. The initial occasions were such that he was on a boat and the boat capsized, on the Mediterranean, and out of 33 people, only 7 survived the rest of them drown. He was lucky the first time the second time a similar disaster happened. Then he gave up and decided that he was going to voluntarily return to Ghana.

Maggie Perzyna: Even when migrants are able to make it to their destination, their ability to remain is far from guaranteed. Professor Kandilige knows people have spent years building new lives in the UK, only to be tracked down by authorities at their place of work and deported almost immediately. 

Dr. Leander Kandilige: You are not allowed to pass anything. So, all the wealth that you'd have accumulated over 10 years, 15 years or 5 years as the case might be. Your money, if you are not lucky to be able to access it before you are found out, you are returned in the state that you were arrested. There are a few who are able to liase with their network members to secure their property or to try and then transfer money on their behalf but it is extremely difficult.

Maggie Perzyna: For many Ghanian migrants, the return home is just as unpredictable, if not more distressing as their initial efforts to migrate. 

Dr. Leander Kandilige: When they ultimately return, there's actually very little for them to be able to sustainably reintegrate themselves into the community of origin. I'm aware that certain initiatives have been set up where to some extent, they try to provide them with reintegration packages, including equipment to go into farming or setting up. A startup kind of support to set up businesses. But the broader or the larger majority of those who return are mentally disturbed, and they need psychosocial support.

Maggie Perzyna: For Dr. Kandilige, all of these factors are a cause for reflection on the following question:

Dr. Leander Kandilige: Do we all have access to the same bundle of rights, or as some people more equal than others?

Maggie Perzyna: Dr. Leander Kandilige is a senior lecturer at the Center for Migration Studies University of Ghana. He's also a visiting lecturer at the University of Northampton and a research associate at the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford. Many thanks to him for sharing his knowledge on return migration.  Helping me to wade through the significant impact EU bilateral agreements have on African migration patterns are Amanda Bisong and Professor Andrew Geddes. Amanda is a PhD candidate at VU Amsterdam, and a policy officer with the Center for Africa Europe Relations. Andrew Geddes holds a Chair in Migration Studies and is director of the Migration Policy Center at the European University Institute in Florence. Welcome to you both. Thanks for joining me.

Amanda Bisong: Thank you very much. 

Professor Andrew Geddes: Thanks a lot. 

Maggie Perzyna: Bilateral agreements and financial incentives with African nations are key tools used by the European Union to pursue its migration control goals. Could you tell us more about how these work? Amanda, let's start with you. 

Amanda Bisong: Yeah, I think if we look at the current cooperation between European and African countries, we can see that the focus is now on bilateral agreements and using financial incentives. However, one of the important aspects of these bilateral agreements or financial incentives is that it's usually in the form of informal agreements. So, there's really nothing concrete written. I mean, you have MOUs or such flexible frameworks that can be adjusted to fit the needs of either parties.

Maggie Perzyna: Amanda, when you say MOU, you mean a Memorandum of Understanding between nations? 

Amanda Bisong: Yes. So recently, the EU made an agreement with Tunisia, for Tunisia to help in curbing the irregular migration directed towards the EU. The deal was, I think, almost 900 million euros. And it's been criticized by NGOs and academics in both Africa and Europe. Interestingly, also, during the last State of the Union address of the EU Commission President,  Ursula von der Leyen, she said that these types of deals, like the type of deals with Tunisia, are kind of like templates for future migration cooperation agreements or migration cooperation deals with other African countries. So, we're seeing a trend here. And it's not like it's going to ease anytime soon. We're seeing these kinds of agreements with Libya, where Libya gets, since 2015 has gotten about 700 million euros despite the outcry in terms of the massive infringement of human rights when people are returned to Libya, or regarding the activities of the Libyan coast guard. We've also seen the same thing with Morocco, Morocco receiving a significant amount of funding from Spain and from the EU in order to address irregular migration. Similar thing in Egypt, so across North African countries, there has been a trend of using bilateral agreements and financial incentives, also coming further towards the Sahel in Niger and in Mali, there have also been several million euros spent through the ETFs - the European Trust Fund for Africa - that was specifically targeted at addressing irregular migration or curbing irregular migration now also through the new multi-financial framework funding instrument, and indeed you see exactly the same trend that is being continued. 

Maggie Perzyna: Andrew, have bilateral agreements always been used? Or is this a new phenomenon? 

Professor Andrew Geddes: Well, I think Amanda was right to point out that they have become really quite prevalent as a tool of migration policy. I think the bilateral relationships, if we think about a range of issues that states engage each other on are kind of central components of international relations in the absence of kind of binding regional or supranational settings, we see this profusion of bilateral agreement. So, bilateral agreements are kind of rather standard feature of international politics. And in this case, I suppose what it shows is maybe the difficulty the EU, is having in agreeing on a common framework in which the EU will behave with the member states. And instead is looking for these external solutions, where it does deals with other governments, and as Amanda's pointed out for huge amounts of money as well, really significant amounts of money, which I think have very significant effects on the kind of economic systems in the recipient states. As well, of course, with the efforts that are supposed to be dedicated towards border control and border security, which are fundamentally at the heart of the EU rationale for moving towards a continued use of these kinds of agreements.

Maggie Perzyna: The EU is prioritizing using external border control policies in an effort to reduce migration from Africa. What factors are contributing to the push for this agenda? I think if we look at the way, within EU countries, the way politics is also evolving, that we're seeing a trend towards the rise in far-right parties that are anti-migration, we're also seeing the trend in terms of rising numbers when it comes to irregular migration. But it can be argued that this is linked to the failure of migration policies to cater for the needs of migrants who would like to move, to people who are in need of asylum. And we also see in terms of the changing demographics in the EU, is also needed to the gaps in the labor market that need to be filled by migrant labour. But in terms of migration policies, there is some sort of shortfall or some sort of gap that makes it difficult for labour, especially the type of labour needed, which cuts across all skill ranges now, to get access into the EU. And so there's an increased movement in terms of irregular migration. So, the push towards using external border control policies can be linked to these issues. Also, I think, like Andrew mentioned, the fact that within the EU, there's also a lot of some sort of disagreement in terms of what common asylum policy in terms of common migration policies that should be implemented or adopted in member states. And so that's why the focus is on the external borders because that's when you see some sort of common agreement on the steps to be taken or what should be done.

Professor Andrew Geddes: As Amanda has pointed out that, in a way, the external dimension of policy, and the significance it's acquired, is also an indication of the difficulty member states have to agree on the internal dimension of policies. The external dimension is not new. So, within the EU, we can look back to the 1990s, so the early days of this external dimension. But I think since 2015, and the large-scale arrivals from Syria in particular, we're seeing a kind of even stronger focus on this external dimension of policy. And I think there's a correlation with the level of disagreement between the member states that can't agree on the things that they would do together within the EU, sharing responsibility within the EU, has let that, has I think, further stimulated this focus on the external dimension. 

Maggie Perzyna: The ongoing processes of regional integration in Africa play a significant role in shaping migration patterns. Andrew, how are the effects of these EU policies playing out on the ground? 

Professor Andrew Geddes: Well I think that's a really important question, I think how EU policies play on the ground, because then we have to think about, well, what ground are we referring to? So, we're talking about some regional cooperation within regional economic communities, some continental level agreements in the context of the African Union, migration dynamics within Africa, which are really important to remember in relation to this debate about Europe. Most migration is within the African continent. There are also significant other migration routes such as towards the Gulf states for employment. So that kind of context is important, but then the effects of the EU are highly significant, because they can change the political dynamics in quite important ways. So, for instance, in the recent coup, military coup in Niger, there's reports about the linkage then to the effects of cooperation with the EU. But also generally, the amount of resources that flow into governments, kind of change the nature of the political game, in a way. The kind of resources that flow in, it can increase the priority that's given to migration, have stimulated the development migration policies, and perhaps most significant, I'd be really interested to get Amanda's take on this, I think what the EU is doing is in a way, almost trying to consolidate aboard the framework that makes sense in the European context. So, ideas about borders and security that developed in Europe. And perhaps the assumption that these are kind of almost normal features of the international system. And that similar arrangements should also develop in African countries where the history of borders, particularly in their kind of colonial origins, means there's quite a different context. I think the effects are really significant of these EU policies.

Amanda Bisong: The EU policies that are being implemented by African countries or in African countries, have the effect of reshaping migration patterns on the continent, especially within regions. In regions where you have free movement areas established, for example, in West Africa, with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), or in East Africa with the East African Community. They're seeing more restrictions on mobility within these free movement areas. I'll speak specifically about the West African case where we see that there are restrictions on mobility that affects seasonal migration between Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, you have one of the largest migrant corridors in West Africa, where people move for seasonal work in the agricultural sector. And the implementation of these policies have led to increased checks, increased border control measures, making it difficult for people to move for work purposes. We also see in terms of regional trade, that the increased border checks and migration immigration controls, especially for travelers headed towards the northern borders in West Africa. So, everyone headed in that direction is considered a potential migrant, "quote-unquote". So, it makes it difficult also for people to conduct trade along these routes, because then it takes more time for trucks to move, it takes more time for people to move also, because of the increased controls. And livelihoods in general, are being affected by these policies, especially in West Africa, where data shows that about 80% of mobility is within the region and in border communities where people move frequently from one country to another and have to move in search of work or also to study, we're seeing livelihoods in general being affected by the implementation of some of these policies. Another fact is that we're seeing nationalist interests within countries aligning with these EU policies. The push for the othering of migrants. So, migrants are seen as being lazy, or 'migrants are the criminals', or 'migrants are responsible for stealing jobs', 'migrants are living off of welfare'. These kinds of narratives are now becoming prevalent also in the region where previously they weren't. So, you're seeing an alignment of nationalist or xenophobic interests with the EU policies in order to sort of work towards implementing restrictive migration policies in regions where hereto you've had some sort of freer mobility.

Maggie Perzyna: As Europe's policies continued to prioritize migration control, what are the potential implications for the future of migration in the region? Andrew, how might this affect both European and African countries?

Professor Andrew Geddes: In many ways when we're thinking about the future it is always quite difficult. But what we do know is that it's likely to be very powerfully shaped by the developments we see now. So, the things that are happening now, institutional developments, policy developments, are likely to play an important role in shaping the future. What I would perhaps contrast are the kind of drivers of migration and the drivers of migration policy because I think they can push in different and perhaps contradictory directions. So, if we look at the drivers of migration, we can see that economic inequality, political instability, the effects of climate change, can all play a role in migration, not all of it towards Europe, of course, that will be a huge misunderstanding, but can lead people to consider migration as an option for themselves and for their families. And what we're also seeing, though, if we look at the drives of migration governance, so the politics, are more efforts to closure - doesn't mean they will necessarily be successful - but even unsuccessful policies of closure can be very, can quite have quite significant effects. So, I think the kind of the dynamics of migration, the dynamics of migration governance, seem to be now to me to be in tension. And efforts to impose controls and security and restrictions, often in the absence of migration policies themselves and, so migration policy frameworks, I think could be counterproductive. So, yeah, I think there's, I would see that as a possible future was a tension now that could be exacerbated in the future.

Amanda Bisong: If we look in terms of labour migration and I think this is one area that we would probably see some changes, and how these policies, especially when it comes to prioritizing migration control, we might see some shifts. At the national level, there are already some changes across EU member states. So, Germany, for instance, has made some changes to its migration law. And some other states are thinking in the same way. Also moving towards making changes with regards to migration as it relates to labour migration. Changes in migration policies as it relates to labour migration, because of the demand on the labor market for more labour, cut across all skill levels. And this is something that we, in future will see more shifts on this. It's interesting how this will contrast with the focus now on migration control, because it means that there will need to be some level of flexibility in order to attract the needed labour across EU countries. In terms of mobility in Africa, I think we would see that this tendency to prioritize migration control will still affect mobility across regions in Africa. And it's something that probably needs to be considered the response of African countries to this focus on migration control.

Maggie Perzyna: The largest movement of migrants is South to South, not South to North. So, as these bilateral agreements encourage African nations to create border controls, how are they affecting migration flows between African nations? 

Professor Andrew Geddes: Well, I think what the thing here is, that what the EU through its actions is going to do whether this is intended or unintended is stimulate greater flows within African countries and migrants, perhaps who are frustrated in their longer term migration intentions because of the development controlled by European countries, or because they are looking for other opportunities within Africa. So as Amanda has already said, most migration, mobility is within Africa. That will remain the overwhelming dynamic. As for what the European Union is trying to do is, in a sense, close off, or severely restrict that route towards Europe for would-be migrants. So, the relatively small number of African migrants who see Europe as a final destination. To kind of prevent that. So, in a sense to amplify and strengthen in a sense, these flows within Africa.

Amanda Bisong: I agree with Andrew, that the effects of the policies are tailored towards what I would call containment. So, trying to keep people in certain spaces and restrict their mobility. The effect of this, at least from what we've seen in West Africa, is that while it restricts the limited number of people that head towards the EU, but it also restricts mobility within the region. So, while the idea would be to contain people within the region, the effects of having some of these policies, so for example, more border controls in the region, more restrictive migration policies being implemented across countries in the region. The idea, the effect is actually now containing people within spaces. So, making it difficult also for regional mobility to take place, as it had been doing previously, prior to, let's see 2015 when the intensity started in terms of looking at the external borders of the EU, especially as it relates to West African countries. So, I think that we see these restrictive migration policies have the effect of also restricting flows within Africa. But at the same time, the EU is trying to ensure that there is free movement of persons on the continent. And so, you have the EU in 2018, adopted the African Union Free Movement Protocol, which has been ratified only by four member states, but the idea is to be able to allow people to move freely within the continent. Free, of course, within the bounds of legality and gender, and the more sort of controlled mechanism, but still move freely within the continent. And we're seeing that this, if you put this side by side with the EU policies, they don't align. So, the free movement protocol in trying to promote mobility within the continent, the EU policies are trying to contain the movement of people within certain spaces, be it regions, be it countries, and so it does not align with the ideals of the African Union. And so African countries would have to make a choice in terms of what is more important for them to implement, and looking at these different policies also, when it comes to regional policies that promote the mobility of people and how this interacts with EU policies.

Professor Andrew Geddes: That's really an interesting point. I was wondering if in a sense, what could also happen as a consequence of border control, and border security and attempts to restrict or contain mobility is the risk of irregularizing that mobility, of increasing the precariousness for migrants that would that was something you would see as a significant now or as a potential issue?

Amanda Bisong: Indeed, so increasing the irregularity is something that we've also picked up in the narrative when it comes to how mobility and migration is being discussed on the continent. And I would again use the case of West Africa a few years ago, we would rarely see countries making statements like "we have deported X number of irregular migrants from country A to country B". But then I give an example, in I think it was earlier this year from Senegal, a couple of hundreds of Nigerians were deported back to Niger, and it made news in Senegal. And so, you're seeing are not only restrictive languages and restrictive policies, but also the fact that the phrasing around irregular migration is becoming stronger in the region is another effect of the implementation of these EU policies. So, indeed, it will get stronger. And also, the precarity that people will experience, people on the move will get a more heightened. 

Maggie Perzyna: Bilateral agreements often have measures concerning the return of migrants from the EU to Africa. Amanda, can you tell us about these?

Amanda Bisong: So, in some of these bilateral agreements, there are conditions attached with as it relates to return and readmission of all nationals. And I guess there's a, there's a bit of a difference in how return and admission of own nationals, of own country nationals is seen. Within the EU, it's seen as an obligation that countries are obliged to take back their own citizens who reside in an irregular manner. And within most African countries that I have interacted with, it's not seen as an obligation, the right to take back their own third country nationals. What we see actually is that wild return, and we admission is one of the sticky aspects of bilateral cooperation on migration, the EU still insists on putting it in several of these bilateral agreements. However, in practice carrying out returns is more difficult than it appears in the policies because there are national measures or national legal remedies that have to be exhausted. And so, once a decree to, or once a notice to return is issued before the return is actually effected, it may take a couple a number of years while the return process has been contested in the national courts or to international administrative procedures. And so, if you look at the numbers of returns that have occurred, looking I think since 2015, the focus on returns versus the actual number of returns that have occurred at the focus in the discussions, looking at the number of orders returned that have been issued, and the actual number of returns that have occurred are quite lower than expected. And so, this is something that also needs to be considered. Within African countries, on the other hand, cooperation on return has sparked several public outcries. I think, in Mali, once this was probably 2016 or 2017, in Mali, there was a public outcry against cooperating with the EU, against the government, cooperating with the EU on possibly return and readmission of Malian migrants residing irregularly in the EU, and the Malian government had to backtrack on that cooperation. Also in Gambia, there were several outcries. I think in 2020, with the Gambian Government issuing a moratorium on returns from the EU for a certain period until they were able to address some of the issues that were raised domestically. So you may have seen this situations where the focus on return by the EU can lead to domestic backlash in some African countries. 

Maggie Perzyna: The ethical issues around migration management are often debated. How do bilateral agreements and policies intersect with human rights considerations and the well-being of migrants? 

Professor Andrew Geddes: That's one of the key issues. To address that we could think about the EU judicial agreement, which was recently signed, or we could think about the symbolism of that. So, what we saw was the Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni traveling to Tunis with the Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, and President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen for a photograph with the president of Tunisia on an agreement which will transfer huge financial resources to the Tunisian authorities, with very little focus on human rights conditionality. Then we think a couple of weeks ago, a few days ago, actually, where a European Parliament delegation wanted to travel to Tunisia to look at this much more closely and were refused permission to travel. So, that kind of basic scrutiny of an agreement by EU heads of government with another country, there's a resistance to scrutiny. And I think that is very revealing of some of the ethical dilemmas here. Because if the agreement itself is focused on EU border security priorities with some compensation for the Tunisian, governments in the era of economic assistance, human rights conditionality, is minimal to put it mildly. From what I've seen some kind of broad declaration at the start of the text, but very minimal commitment to human rights standards. So, I think that is highly significant. And I think that is going to be challenged. So, the European Parliament are looking at that and other authorities are closely interested in this huge initial agreement, because this is an area of European law, where the European policy where the European Parliament is meant to have a say. And then if we look to other countries, as well, we see grotesque abuses of human rights. I think Libya is a much-cited example of that. And there is enormously important work, I would recommend, for instance a book by Sally Hayden called, 'My Fourth Time We Drowned', which looks at the horror that people experience in Libya. And we can't see that as anything other than the consequences of EU policies. And so that the ethical dilemmas, you know, I suppose that we can see absolutely what is happening beyond the borders of the European Union. And I think that is going to be one of the big issues with European Parliament elections next year, but the effort to subject these kinds of processes to much greater scrutiny, because of the consequences, this has for people and their lives and the terrible abuses that have been reported.

Amanda Bisong: I think that one thing we're seeing with the focus on external borders and externalizing migration policies, is that it's also shifted the responsibility and accountability for certain actions undertaken as a result of the EU's policies. So where, for example, in Libya, there are grotesque human rights abuses. And then within the EU, most times the response from the politicians is well, that's happening in Libya, and that's done by the Libyan coast guard or that's done by the Libyan authorities. That's not done...  those measures are not carried out by any European authorities. And so, it shifts the responsibility and the accountability to third countries, where the standards of human rights are much lower. And within the EU then, there seems to be no responsibility actually, for these actions. And also, the fact that most of these bilateral agreements, like I stated earlier, are informal, or we'll see in terms of MOUs, or sometimes not clearly written, makes it difficult to have parliamentary scrutiny of these agreements. So, previously, where you had like a migration cooperation agreement written in a more contractual format, and not really informally, or these non-formal documents, then it was easier to have parliamentary scrutiny over these kinds of documents because you would need to have Parliaments to agree before engaging in cooperation in these kinds of deals. But now with the current system, it makes it difficult to also have this kind of scrutiny. So, I think the question here then, is really who bears responsibility and accountability and how far down can the EU kick the ball? Can European countries kick the ball when it comes to being responsible for actions that are funded by the taxpayer’s money?

Professor Andrew Geddes: Yeah, because I think that that's a great analogy kicking the ball is how far can they kick the ball. And when we look at the recent State of the Union speech by Commission President von der Leyen, she hailed the Tunisia agreements as a template, a way forward to the European Union. So, I think they want to kickball quite a long way down the road or down the field. However, we pursue that analogy. But that is, that seems to me to be very much at the center of EU migration policy. And there's a political dynamic there as well, within the European Union, you look at the government that are driving this - right wing governments with parties that have been taking very tough positions on immigration, are currently driving the EU agenda. So, it's maybe not surprising to see this, but they want to kick this ball a long way. 

Maggie Perzyna: Moving forward, what do you think is missing from policies and agreements that would be mutually beneficial for both EU member nations and migrants from African nations?

Amanda Bisong: So, I think the first thing would be when it comes to respect of human rights. I think that what we're seeing in the policies and agreements now, measures being implemented that do not consider the human rights of migrants and people on the move. And I think this is something that needs to be brought back into focus. With the Global Compact on Migration, one of the principles had to do with ensuring the rights of migrants, but then in actual implementation of migration policies, especially EU migration policies in African countries, there is huge lack of respect for the human rights of migrants and people on the move. And I think this is one of the issues that really needs to be addressed. Whether the actions are carried out by European authorities themselves, whether the actions are carried out by the authorities of the African nations, but funded by the EU, these are issues that need to be addressed. I think another thing also is looking again at the need to have what we would call, ‘legal pathways to migration’. Looking at the possibilities of increasing these legal pathways to migration, not only because of the fact that most people who want to move to the EU would rather move for work, but also because within the EU demographic challenges are also popping up making it difficult to find labour across the US. So, I think that this is something that needs to also come back into the discussions - how to bring in more opportunities for, for people to move to the EU for work. If you listen to the speech, the speeches of most politicians we keep hearing, they always talk about breaking the smuggling model. But then the policies they go forward to implement, actually empowering migrant smuggling businesses. So, I think that this is something that also needs to be considered. Looking at the policies that are really necessary to break this smuggling model by possibly looking at creating other visa pathways or other pathways for people needing protection to access the protection that can be offered by the EU without using the services of smugglers as it currently is because of the policies.

Professor Andrew Geddes: I fully agree with that. But I think one of the things that we could return to also is the extent to which there is a kind of, there are common interests here. Within the new European Union, we can see quite significant divisions. I don't think African countries are speaking necessarily with one voice on migration issues. And also fundamental to Europe and Africa, I think there are different positions in relationship to international migration that make this say, a difficult issue and I don't think there is any other way around the fact that this is a difficult issue within the European Union, within the African Union, and also, obviously, within the relations between the EU and AU and African countries. So, I think that you know, that I would see that as kind of an important part of the context. This is a difficult issue area, where there are significant differences between all the relevant parties. And so, I will think that progress is more likely through smaller steps. I mean what we do see are very big declarations, which typically don't head anywhere. And what we witness on the ground, that maybe the smaller, more meaningful actions, which are kind of bilateral agreements that we began our discussion about. And perhaps it's through these kinds of agreements, that we could begin to see the scope for a rethinking of migration, which ensures that human rights standards are necessary components of these agreements and begins also to think about potential economic benefits of migration. But of course, again, that is contested in European countries. So, I don't think it would be uncontested to argue for pathways to new migration. But at the same time, I think there is a willingness amongst European citizens to accept that economic migration can be necessary to certain sectors. So, yeah, I think there's a lot of work would need to be done to kind of build a different vision of migration. And at the moment, what we in fact, see is a continual doubling down on an approach which, as we have seen, this kind of doubling down on the security approach is not producing benefits for governments and obviously not for migrants, because of the terrible loss of life that we see. Going back to a point that Amanda was making earlier on in the discussion about return. And Amanda was absolutely right to point out, if you look at the data on returns, you'll see that they are return decisions issued and so people are required to leave. And then you look at the return rate, which is typically around a quarter and remains a relatively flat line to over time, the number of people that should return and rent around a relatively low percentage of those against whom return decision have been issued. So, what does that mean? Well, what it means is that more people are kind of subject to a very precarious existence and also with the way things go are increasingly subjected to detention, which may in turn into kind of relatively long-term detention, because of their irregular situation. So, there's an external dimension to return policy but also an internal dimension because of people who are essentially placed in limbo. Certainly in Italy, the country in which I'm based, increasing efforts to detain people. And that could be for quite long periods of time because these decisions are difficult to implement.

Maggie Perzyna:Thanks to Amanda Bisong and Andrew Geddes for joining me today. And thank you for listening. This is a CERC migration podcast produced in collaboration with lead podcasting. If you enjoyed the episode, subscribe to Borders & Belonging on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. For more information on the effects of EU bilateral agreements on African migration, please visit the show notes. I'm Maggie Perzyna. Thanks for listening!